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Muslim Radicalization in Prison:
Responding with Sound Penal Policy or the Sound of Alarm?
Spearlt*
ABSTRACT

This article assesses radicalizationamong Muslim prisoners in the post9/11 era by analysis of ethnographic data in light of the available research.
There are two primary motives that drive this inquiry: (1) to determine whether
prisons are 'fertile soil for jihad" as claimed, and (2) to the extent prisoner
radicalization does occur, determine the ideological motives. In the last
decade, politicians and analysts have clamored about the "danger" and
"threat" posed by Islam in American prisons. Yet these characterizationssit in
tension with several decades of sustainedIslamic outreach in prison to support
inmate rehabilitationand re-entry. They also sit in tension with the fact that
since the 1960s, Muslims have been proactive about using American courts to
deal with disputes and grievances. Today, Muslims are arguably the most
proactive litigants among religious followers in prison. Overlooking these
important developments misses a longstanding pedigree of Muslim inmates
helping shape prison law and policy; it is a history that flips the discourse on
its head by suggesting that Islam brings peace, rather than violence, to
inmates, and that the true "threat" posed by Muslim inmates is the threat of a
lawsuit. Despite this positive influence, penal institutions have implemented
suppressive interventions against Muslim inmates. Unfortunately, some have
backfired and worked to stoke radicalization instead. The final part of this
article considers the top prospectsfor reform in this area. Long-term strategies
include: supporting religiouspluralism in prison, reforming educationalpolicy,
and working to stabilize prisoner re-entry. These prescriptions correspond to
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University; Fellow, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. Special thanks to
professors Kelly Strader, Giovanna Shay, Mark Cammack, Lynn S. Branham, Noah
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the fact that violent extremism among Muslim prisoners, although relatively
rare, does not mean radicalizationdoes not occur-itdoes and perhaps always
will. Institutions thus have a great stake in reducing prospectsfor extremism
generally, and fostering normative religious practice within its confines.
Sustained strategic planning in these areas will help keep this relatively small
problem, small.
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I.

APPROACHING AND INTERPRETING PRISONER RADICALIZATION

"Radicalization," according to one inmate, is when "prisons try to promote
Christianity and starve Islam."' This statement came in a letter from a Muslim

inmate, Abdullah al-Muhajair, sent to Representative Peter King in his role as
chair of the 2011 U.S. congressional hearings entitled, The Threat of MuslimAmerican Radicalizationin U.S. Prisons.Representative King's opinion on this
matter sees Islamic radicalization as a unique threat since Muslims are, as he
claims, "the only group in prison which is tied to overseas terrorists which is

1.
Letter from Roy Wales, a.k.a. Abdullah al-Muhajair, Prisoner, Hudson
Correctional Facility, to Peter King, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 9,
2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Prisoner].
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part of an existential threat to the United States." Hence, his account of the
problem sits diametrically opposed to al-Muhajair's views, which together
underscore the critical need to approach the question of prisoner radicalization
with a sense of caution and consistency.
What follows relies on ethnographic sources to explore radicalization
among Muslim prisoners. The data sets include testimony from incarcerated
Muslims, testimony from congressional hearings, and case studies involving
Muslim inmates and extremist violence. The data is examined in light of recent
research on administrative and penal policies in prison.3 Together these sources
reveal the complex relationship between the prison environment and
radicalization, the internally and externally generated problems, as well as the
nature of the prison experience, post-release experiences, and the relationship
between pre-prison and post-release experiences.5
This article starts with a simple question: What exactly is radicalization?
To be certain, the term is a very recent creation, gaining widespread use in the
years following the attacks of 9/11 and becoming intertwined with the Muslim
faith.6 In broad strokes, the term indicates a process or means by which one
adopts radicalism or radical beliefs and behaviors. This much is simple, but
determining the exact content of radicalis not always certain since the term has

2.
FoxNewslnsider, Peter King: We Want to Stop Prisonersfrom Being Radicalized
in Prison, YouTUBE (June 15, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3RnF6Rp4Ip4.
3.
The ethnographic data on prisoners include surveys and interviews with current
and former prisoners, as well as letters collected from incarcerated Muslims, the bulk of
which was collected in 2006 from inmates in California facilities. The congressional
hearings on Islam in prison have taken place in 2003, 2006, 2011, and speakers at these
events include politicians, chaplains, scholars, and law enforcement and correctional experts.
See Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and Prisons:
Hearingbefore the S. Committee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, 108th
Cong. 1 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Senate Hearing]; Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist
Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Senate Hearing]; The
Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in US. Prisons, Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter 2011 House Hearing].
4.
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, DANGEROUS CONVICTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES IN PRISON, 4 (2002), http://archive.adl.org/learn/ext-terr/dangerous
convictions.pdf.
5.
Gaetano Joe Ilardi, Prison Radicalisation-the Devil is in the Detail 2-3 (ARC
Linkage Project on Radicalisation, 2010), available at http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/
radicalisation/files/2013/03/conference-2010-prison-radicalisation-gji.pdf.
6.
See generally DAVID R. MANDEL, Radicalization: What Does it Mean?, in HOMEGROWN
TERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING
AND
ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES
OF
RADICALISATION AMONG GROUPS WITH AN IMMIGRANT HERITAGE IN EUROPE (Thomas M.

Pick et al. eds., 2009).
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historically attached to different meanings. For example, early use of radical
was loyal to the etymology of rad, which meant "radish" or "roots," hence, a
radical connoted one returning to "roots" of tradition-the origins or essence.
Used this way, radical overlaps in meaning with the notion of fundamentalist,
which similarly conveys a turn to the basics or fundamentals. Later use of
radical, however, would connote a somewhat opposite meaning, as movement
away from a particular norm, being "far out" or "extreme" with respect to the
cultural status quo. Such use is not typically viewed as a pejorative since
radicals were often seen as progressives who contributed to the development of
thought, politics, and culture.
Today, however, the meaning of radicalization is not typically intended as
a positive association. More particularly, it has been something of a code for
violent behavior and ideology, despite the fact that violence is the exception
among radicals. Take, for example, the 2006 congressional hearings, where one
expert testified: "Occasionally, I am asked to describe the typical radicalized
inmate. While it seems a reasonable question, I would suggest that focusing
only on individual inmates is not an appropriate solution. In fact, terrorism is a
team sport."8 This perspective corroborates with the New York City Police
Department's model of radicalization, which concludes at a stage of violence
called "jihadization."9 More formal attempts to define radicalization follow
suit, including the Department of Justice's definition as "the process by which
inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views,
including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious
purposes." 0 Characterized as such, radicalization is hardly a principled
concept, and instead functions as a catchall for "what goes on before the bomb

7.

Thomas Hintze, Radicalization and the Semantics of Peter King, (Mar. 16,

2011), http://thebusysignal.com/2011/03/16/radicalization-and-the-semantics-of-peter-king/.
8.
2006 Senate Hearing,supranote 3 (statement by Gregory B. Saathoff, Executive
Director, Critical Incident Analysis Group, University of Virginia) (emphasis added).
9.

MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, INTELLIGENCE DIvIsIoN, NEW YORK

POLICE DEPARTMENT, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 6-7 (2007)

available at http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD
izationin theWest.pdf.
10.

Report-Radical

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS' SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS 6 n.6

(2004) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. This definition follows those in homeland security circles.
See HOMELAND SEC. POLICY INST. & CRITICAL INCIDENT ANALYSIS

GRP., OUT OF THE

SHADOWS: GETTING AHEAD OF PRISONER RADICALIZATION 3 (2006) [hereinafter HSPI &

CIAG REPORT]; 2006 Senate Hearing,supra note 3 (statement of Frank J. Cilluffo, Director
of Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University, adopting a
variant ofthis definition).
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goes off."" The ascriptions are typically couched in terms of good and bad,
right and wrong, and other dichotomies that convey the subjective perceptions
of physical danger.12
The logic is flawed; radicalization is an insufficient cause of terrorism,
most obviously because most radicals are not terrorists.13 Indeed extremism
cuts both ways, and just as one can will toward extremist violence, another can
toward extreme pacifism. Individuals like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther
King were radicals of the first order, bent on non-violence at all costs. Yet this
dimension of radicalization is lost in today's usage. Unfortunately, violencebased logic leads to fallacious forms of debate in which radicalization is viewed
as the root cause of terrorism and, in turn, terrorism is proof of one's
radicalization.14 Yet radicalism itself is an insufficient predictor of terrorism,
since most extremists do not engage in violent activities.' 5 This point is
supported by more recent creations of phrases like violent radicalization or
militant radicalization, to indicate a difference between radical thought and
violent behavior.' 6 As one study admonishes:
Radicalization should not be viewed as an escalator, inevitably
carrying all the individuals on it inexorably into violence. It is better
envisaged as a funnel that large number of individuals may enter but
from which only a very small number of individuals emerge. Many
will drop out along the way, leaving only a small proportion to cross
the Rubicon and become involved in terrorism.17
In this crossing, there is no singular pathway to becoming radical, and no single
factor for adopting extremist views.' 8
The tendency to view violence as a part of what radicalization means is
further clouded by its constant conflation with the term conversion. Although
there may be overlap in the way conversion and radicalization manifest, they

11.
PETER. R. NEUMANN, Introduction, in PERSPECTIVES ON RADICALISATION AND
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 6 (Peter R. Neumann et al., eds. 2008).
12.
See MANDEL, supra note 6 at 106.
13.
See MANDEL, supra note 6 at 102.
14.
MANDEL, supra note 6, at 102.
15.
MANDEL, supra note 6, at 102.
16.
NEUMANN, supra note 11; see, e.g., Violent Radicalization and Homegrown
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1955, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
17.
GREG HANNAH ET AL., RADICALIZATION OR REHABILITATION: UNDERSTANDING
THE CHALLENGE OF EXTREMIST AND RADICALIZED PRISONERS 3 (2008).

18.
Mark S. Hamm, Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S.
Correctional Institutions, 261 NIJ J. 14, 18 (2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles I/nij/224085.pdf.
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are distinct concepts that potentially point in opposite directions.19 Indeed,
Muslim converts may be less susceptible to extremist violence since they are in
a reformation process, and are therefore less vulnerable due to opposition to
violence. 20 Put plainly, for those on a path to peace, violent extremism may be
an anathema. Practically, this difference is obvious since an individual can
radicalize within his own tradition, in which case there is not a conversion, as
typically understood, but more of a difference in theology or commitment.
Conversely, conversion does not necessitate that ideology play a significant
role in one's transformation since some converts are more motivated by
religious experiences or antecedent trauma than by doctrine. In these instances,
conversion is less ideology than epiphany. Recent research supports the point
by suggesting inmates are more likely to convert in maximum-security
facilities, which by definition are more dangerous.2 1
The tendency to disregard the difference between these phenomena is
common. At the 2011 congressional hearings, Representative Peter King
described a report that mentions three dozen individuals who converted to
22
Islam in prison.22 He then paraphrases the report: "I'll say that again. Dozens of
ex-cons who became radicalized Muslims inside U.S. prisons...."' Most
recently, respected criminologist Mark Hamm iterates the error in his recent
book on prisoner radicalization, which cites the report without challenging
Representative King's analysis.24 Similar portrayal is made of James Cromitie,
who converted in prison, but who was not arrested on terror-related charges
until years after his release. Despite evidence only of his conversion,
Representative King claims Cromitie "was radicalized in a New York
prison." 25
Failure to distinguish these concepts undoubtedly impacts the assessment
of radicalization in significant ways. Conflating conversion with radicalization
19.
Ilardi, supra note 5, at 4 (describing how the study of inmate radicalization
should not be "encumbered by notions of some sinister and inevitable connection between
conversion and radicalisation").
20. Mark S. Hamm, Prison Islam in the Age of Sacred Terror, 49 BRIT. J. CRIM'Y
667, 669 (2009).
21.
THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
RELIGION IN PRISONS: A 50-STATE SURVEY OF PRISON CHAPLAINS 50 (2012) [hereinafter PEW
SURVEY], availableat http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/03/Religion-in-Prisons.pdf.
22.
2011 House Hearing,supranote 3, at 204.
23.
2011 House Hearing,supra note 3, at 204 (emphasis added).
24. MARK S. HAMM, THE SPECTACULAR FEW: PRISONER RADICALIZATION AND THE
EVOLVING TERRORIST THREAT x-xi (2013).
25.
Peter King, The Threat of Muslim Radicalization in U.S. Prisons, THE HILL'S
CONGRESS BLOG, (June 15, 2011,
11:29 A.M.), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/homland-security/1 66557-the-threat-of-muslim-radicalization-in-us-prisons.
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exaggerates the prevalence of the latter. As research and reports indicate, Islam
is the fastest growing religion in prison, which means widespread conversion.
This research estimates that out of all those who seek faith while in prison,
approximately eighty percent turn to Islam;26 that one-third of AfricanAmerican inmates converted to Islam at one correctional facility; 2 7 and that a
majority of 730 prison chaplains agreed that Islam is growing faster than any
other tradition in prison,28 with others estimating that 30,000 or 40,000 prison
conversions take place annually.29 With these impressive figures, it is clearly
untenable to make one synonymous with the other.
As this part has tried to convey, the attempt to isolate factors that motivate
extremism is complicated, and there are many obstacles to a better
understanding of the issue. Perhaps most critically, questions about causality
haunt any analysis of the relationship between radicalization and the
correctional context. The plain fact is that some inmates enter prison with
clearly extremist views and proclivities. For these individuals, the prison is
merely incidental to a worldview ignited long before the individual walked
through the prison gates. Likewise, problems in timing surface in those exprisoners who become involved in violent extremism well after their release.
Such cases, in addition to reigniting debates about importation versus
deprivation theories of imprisonment, cast doubts on theories that cite the
prison as causally significant. Despite these looming questions, Islam has been
cast as a definite danger and existential threat, the substance of which is
examined next.
II.

ALARMISM AND POLITICAL DISTORTIONS

It is critical to understand how fear-based perceptions about Muslims and
Islam have hampered objective inquiry into Islam in prison, and perhaps more
critically, how they have concretely informed penal policy. Despite three
congressional hearings and a growing body of scholarly research, there are still
many unknowns. More certain, however, is that perceptions about Islam in
26.
Nawal H. Ammar et al., Muslims in Prison: A Case Study from Ohio State
Prisons,48 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 414-28 (2004).
27.
See MATTHEW SILBERMAN, A WORLD OF VIOLENCE: CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 46
(1995).
28.
PEW SURVEY, supra note 21, at 22.
29. AARON RAPPAPORT ET AL., Homeland Security and the Inmate Population: The
Risk and Reality of Islamic Radicalization in Prison, in SPECIAL NEEDS OFFENDERS IN
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 431. 432 (Lior Gideon ed., 2012).
30.
See, e.g., JEROME P. BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41416, AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT (2010);
NEUMANN, supra note 11; DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-Ross & LAURA GROSSMAN, HOMEGROWN
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prison are tainted by a climate of suspicion and fear, some of which derive
from fears entirely unrelated to Islam, including multiple perceived threatscriminals, prisoners, gang members, African-Americans, Latinos, and
Muslims-a mix "that can easily overflow into unthinking hysteria."3 1
Accordingly, public and political backlash against Muslims defines the post-9/
11 era. Empirically speaking, there has been a spike in reported hate crimes
against Muslims, 3 2 including killings of Muslims and non-Muslims mistaken to
be Muslim, 3 3 along with Quran burnings, 3 4 mosque bombings,35 anti-Sharia
initiatives, 36 and a generally unfavorable attitude against Muslims. American
mosques have been under government scope for harboring militant
extremists,37 and city police have implemented spy operations against Muslim
communities,38 not to mention oppression in prisons like Guantanamo Bay.
Heated political debate in the post-9/11 era reflects great divides in opinion
among academics and policymakers on the question of prisoner radicalization.
According to a 2007 study funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ),
"The literature on Islam in prison is divided into two camps that could not be

TERRORISTS INTHE U.S. AND U.K.: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE RADICALIZATION
PROCESS (2009); CENTER FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM, BLACK AMERICA, PRISONS AND RADICAL
ISLAM: A REPORT (2008); MARK S. HAMM, TERRORIST RECRUITMENT IN AMERICAN
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF NON-TRADITIONAL FAITH
GROUPS (2007), availableat https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/220957.pdf; HSPI &
CIAG REPORT, supra note 10.
31.
RAPPAPORT ET AL., supra note 29, at 432.
32.
See, e.g., FBI: Dramatic Spike in Hate Crimes Targeting Muslims, SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browseall-issues/2012/spring/fbi-dramatic-spike-in-hate-crimes-targetin (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
33.
See, e.g., Arsalan Iftikhar, My Take: Sikh Temple Shooting is act of Terrorism,
CNN (Aug. 6, 2012, 11:20 AM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/06/my-take-sikhtemple-shooting-is-act-of-terrorism/.
34.
See, e.g., Adelle M. Banks, Florida Pastor Oversees Quran Burning, USA
TODAY (March 21, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2011-03-21-quranburning-floridaN.htm.
35.
See, e.g., Kari Huus, Attacks on US. Mosques Prompt Muslim Security
Concerns, NBC NEWS (Aug. 17, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/news/2012/08/17/
13321512-attacks-on-us-mosques-prompt-muslim-security-concerns.
36.
See, e.g., Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Oklahoma's Anti-Shariah Law Put on Hold,
For Now, NPR (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld
=131168920.
37.
See, e.g., Raza v. City of New York - Legal Challenge to NYPD Muslim
Surveillance Program, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/raza-v-city-new-yorklegal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
38.
Id.

2013/14]

MUSLIM RADICALIZATION IN PRISON

45

farther apart."3 One side tends to make claims based on assessments that
center on a number of explicit and implicit arguments, including that Islam
represents a unique and particularly dangerous threat in U.S. prisons, that U.S.
prisons are factories for al-Qaeda-style radicalization, and that foreign
influences are engaged in terror recruitment and fomenting extremism inside
prisons, including Wahhabism. 40 As unsettling as these claims may be, they
have proved highly speculative and based on little to no evidence or on
research that lacks methodological rigor. As the NIJ study notes:
The alarmist position is based on research that is not only
contradictory in places, but it lacks any real depth of understanding
about the nature of prisoner subcultures, the social processes of
religious conversion, and the vulnerability of individuals to
recruitment by terrorists groups. The studies are also devoid of social
scientific methodologies; there are no interviews with or observations
of prisoners, and they offer only scant evidence on the perceptions of
wardens, guards, chaplains, and security threat group administrators.
Beyond that, they are riddled with errors.4 1
In stark contrast
about Islam in U.S.
relationship between
these social scientific

is a small but growing body of research, whose reports
prisons are based on data that is skeptical about the
prisoner conversions to Islam and terrorism. 42 Among
claims, there is little support for the idea that U.S. prisons

39.
Hamm, supranote 18, at 669; more recently, the author placed his own research
in a "third camp," arguing that radicalization occurs "only under specific conditions of
confinement." See HAMM, supra note 24, at 51-52 (2013). The focus on conditions of
confinement is incomplete, however, since it ignores inmates themselves-their experiences
and proclivities, which are critical factors. From Hamm's perspective, there would be no
concern at having the most hardened radicals all at the same institution, as long as they are
kept in comfortable conditions of confinement. The flaw is perhaps evinced in the JIS case,
the work's primary case study of prison-based jihad as some researchers posit that conditions
of confinement likely did not play a significant role in the JIS terror plots. See Bert Useem &
Obie Clayton, Radicalization of U.S. prisoners, 8 CRIM'Y & PUB. POL'Y. 561, 581 (2009)
(suggesting that the JIS leader, Kevin James, was more interested in dealing with enemies
like the NOI and Shia Muslims, and that had he not entered prison, he likely would have
followed the same path of radicalization; more critically, they point out that his 100-page
manifesto gives no indication of grievance with guards or the prison institution: "If bad
prison conditions or the humiliation of the prison experience had moved James toward
radicalization, then it is reasonable to expect that he would have said so in this document.
Yet he did not. That James's manifesto did not dwell on prison conditions suggests other
reasons for his radicalization." Id).
40. For an overview see HAMM, supra note 30, at 22-23.
41.
HAMM, supranote 30, at 25.
42.
HAMM, supra note 30, at 25-26.
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are factories for Muslim terrorism, but instead, indications demonstrate that
Islam is a support for inmate rehabilitation and re-entry.43
These two positions, which appear hopelessly at odds, nonetheless share
common ground. For example, at least some within the alarmist camp
acknowledge the potentially rehabilitative aspects of Islam for inmates.4 In
turn, there are those social scientists that note the violent nature of prison
conditions, particularly in maximum-security facilities. These facilities foster
environments for extremist ideology, as one researcher claims, "[T]he more
extreme, harsh, dangerous, or otherwise psychologically-taxing the nature of
the confinement, the greater the number of people who will suffer and the
deeper the damage that they will incur." 45 Regardless of the reluctance to admit
these points; however, both sides of the debate concede that radicalization
rarely leads to terrorist activity. 46
Despite many uncertainties about radicalization as a phenomenon,
politicians and other state officials have not refrained from making
overreaching claims about radicalization and prisons. To illustrate, during the
2006 U.S. Senate hearings on prisoner radicalization, Senator Jon Kyl
(Arizona, Republican) asserted, "Jose Padilla, a terrorist accused of trying to
build a dirty bomb to unleash in the United States was exposed to radical Islam
in the U.S. prison."47 In the 2011 hearings, experts and politicians alike
continued to invoke Jose Padilla as an inmate who was radicalized in prison.48
Even prior to the 2011 hearings, Republican staffers for the Committee on
Homeland Security distributed a background sheet entitled Background
Information on Prominent Post-9/11 U.S. Prison Radicalization Cases, which

listed Padilla as a prison convert.4 9 However, Padilla did not convert to Islam

For an overview, see HAMM supranote 30, at 20-2 1.
43.
44.
See, e.g., 2011 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 260 (statement of Patrick
Dunleavy, retired Deputy Inspector, Criminal Intelligence Unit, New York Department of
Correctional services).
CRAIG HANEY, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF INCARCERATION: IMPLICATIONS
45.
FOR POST-PRISON ADJUSTMENT 5 (2002).

46.
Hamm, supra note 18, at 682.
2003 Senate Hearing,supra note 3, at 2.
47.
See Testimony of William I Bratton, Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police
48.
Department,Countering the Radicalization Threat: An Intelligence-Led PolicingChallenge,
INVESTIGATIVEPROJECT.ORG, (Apr. 5 2007) [hereinafter Bratton Testimony], http://www.

investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/276.pdf; OIG REPORT, supranote 10, at 6.
49.
Background Information on Prominent Post-9/11 Prison Radicalization Cases,
HOUSE

COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY

(June 15,

2011)

[hereinafter

Background

Information], http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/06-15-11%20Prison
%20Radicalization%20Background%20on%2OKey/o20Cases.pdf.
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until after he was released, nor did he travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan until
seven years after his parole.s0
The same information sheet lists other inaccurate information. It describes
James Cromitie as being "radicalized in prison," despite the fact that he was
paroled in 2004 and was not arrested on terror-related crimes until five years
later.5 Despite the use of him and others as poster boys for inmate
radicalization, there is little evidence, either before or immediately after their
incarceration, to connect time in prison causally to acts of violent extremism.
The sheet also cites Michael Finton as "radicalized in an Illinois state prison,"
without evidence to substantiate the claim; similarly, it cites the Lackawanna
Six terror plot without any explanation of why this case counts as prison
radicalization. 52 Furthermore, it cites to the abovementioned 2010 report,
overseen by Senator John Kerry (Massachusetts, Democrat), which described
three dozen prison converts who went to Yemen to learn Arabic. 53 Careful
scrutiny of the report raises serious doubts that this should be a part of the
information sheet. The report states, "U.S. officials told [c]ommittee staff that
they fear that these Americans were radicalized in prison and traveled to
Yemen for training." 54 These statements came with no citations for the
statements, no evidence of the extremism or intent to commit violence, and no
mention of who the prisoners were; and the beliefs about radicalization were
admittedly based on fear. Although this report contained no verifiable evidence
that these individuals had converted, much less were radicalized in prison, the
story was accepted and invoked as evidence throughout the rest of the report.
Like Padilla, commentators repeatedly cite Richard Reid, the shoe bomber,
as an example of prisoner radicalization. Although scholarly works,55 thinktank publications, 56 and congressional statements and reports 57*cite his name,
there is little to support the claim that he was radicalized in prison.5 In fact, a

50. See Ilardi, supra note 5, at 9-10; but see HAMM, supra note 24 (suggesting that
the amount of time between release and the attempted terrorist attack should not imply the
prison played a minor role in radicalization).
51.
Background Information,supra note 49.
52. BackgroundInformation, supra note 49.
53.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 111TH CONG., AL QAEDA INYEMEN
AND SOMALIA: A TIcING TIME BOMB, S. Prt. 111-40, at 1 (Comm. Print 2010).

54.
55.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
See e.g., HAMM, supra note 24, at 184 (listing Reid on the "Prisoner

Radicalization/Terrorism Database"); Hamm, supra note 18, at 668.

56. HSPI & CIAG REPORT, supra note 10, at iii.
57. See 2003 Senate Hearing, supra note 3; 2006 Senate Hearing, supra note 3;
2011 House Hearing,supra note 3; Bratton Testimony, supra note 48, at 213, 221, 224.
58. HAMM, supra note 24, at 47.
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closer look at the historical record59 suggests that he likely adopted extremist
beliefs, and sought to engage in violence after he spent time at the Brixton
mosque where he regularly heard sermons from the Abdullah El-Faisal, who
was arrested in 2003 for attempting to incite violence.
As these cases indicate, inaccuracy and misinformation plague inquiry into
Muslim-American prisoners. Compounding this is a general lag in research
compared to other countries, some of which is likely to yield unsavory
consequences, or as some researchers have put it, "In light of the powerful
emotions that are provoked by the fear of prison radicalization, the failure to
move ahead with that kind of research effort will mean that policy will
inevitably be carried along not by reason, but by the political passions
inevitably at play."60
These and other challenges surmount the quest to understand extremism in
prison beyond the idea that Muslims are a particularly deadly threat. Yet it is
without doubt that prison gangs single-handedly pose the greatest threat to
institutional security. Moreover, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data
point out that white supremacist groups, like the Aryan Brotherhood (AB), are
among the most deadly groups in prison. Representing less than one-tenth of
one percent of the entire prison population, the AB is responsible for eighteen
percent of all prison murders across the country, numerous violent and drug
related offenses outside of prison, and various attempted acts of terrorism.
The technical capabilities of supremacist groups were noted in a 2007 prison
intelligence report indicating that these groups are the most capable of using
improvised explosive devices (IED). 62
Nonetheless, the excessive scrutiny of Muslims manages to omit the
positive aspects of Islam in prison, including those prison converts who have
helped foil terrorist plots. For example, there is little mention of Derrick
Shareef, who planned to attack a shopping mall, but was stopped by the FBI
with the help of an ex-gang member named William "Jamaal" Chrisman, who
63
converted to Islam in prison. Instrumental in preventing this attack, Chrisman
stated that he decided to work as an informant to help the government because
after the attacks of 9/11, "scholars in Saudi Arabia and Morocco said it was

59.

OIG Report, supra note 10, at 6.

60.

RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 433.

61.

David Holthouse, Leaders of Racist Prison Gang Aryan Brotherhood Face

Federal Indictment, INTELLIGENCE REP. 119 (2005), available at http://www.splcenter.

org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2005/fall/smashing-the-shamrock.
62.
HAMM, supra note 24, at 118 (citing Karl Mercer, "Terrorism Behind The
Walls," Presented at the American Correctional Association 13 7th Annual Congress of
Correction (Aug. 12, 2007)).
63.
BJELOPERA, supra note 30, at 34-35.
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incumbent on Muslims to stop terrorists."6 This theme was echoed in a
different plot in Seattle in 2011, which was foiled through the help of a prison
convert-and there may be others.65 These outcomes suggest a different story
about the role of Islam in prison, a more beneficent side, which is treated in
more detail next.
III. MUSLIMS INCRIMINAL JUSTICE
This part of the article presents a current snapshot of Islam in American
criminal justice and the problems facing Islamic communities in prison. Paying
particular attention to how Muslims have affected prison law and culture, it
explores Islam's legacy in U.S. courts and prisons. For well over half a
century, Muslims have used courts to establish religious rights for inmates in
the same time Islamic outreach groups were assisting inmates through prison
ministry and re-entry support. This history of Islam in prisons offers a
compelling counter-narrative to the distortions described above.
A. A Legacy in U.S. Courts and Prisons

What have long been called "Black Muslim" organizations, such as the
Nation of Islam (NOI) and the Moorish Science Temple, began formal prison
ministry in the 1940s, concentrating their efforts on converting AfricanAmerican inmates.66 Within a few short years of establishing its prison
outreach program, the NO] gained its most famous convert, Malcolm Little,
also known as Malcolm X. The 1950s and early 1960s were a time of small but
steady numbers of conversions to these organizations, which was particularly
due to outreach efforts. In this era, prison outreach programs sought to instill
values of honesty, hard work, individual responsibility, as well as mechanisms

64. Michael P. Mayko, FBI Informant Testifies in Terror Case, CONNECTICUT POST
(Nov. 30, 2007), http://winterparking.blogspot.com/2007/11/ct-post-fbi-informant-testifiesin.html.
65.
Levi Pulkkinen, Man at Center of Seattle Terror Plot Admits Guilt, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Man-at-centerof-Seattle-terror-plot-admits-guilt-4098072.php; Lindsay Chamberlain, Informant Who
Divulged Terror Plot to FBI is a Convicted Felon, KING 5 NEws, http://www.
king5.com/news/local/Informant-who-divulged-terror-plot-to-FBI-is-a-convicted-felon124511549.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013); see also BJELOPERA, supra note 30, at 49
(noting the plot involving Michael Finton also was foiled through the help of a prisoner who
converted to Islam).
66.

53 (1999).

KARL EVANZZ, THE MESSENGER: THE RISE AND FALL OF ELIJAH MUHAMMAD 152-
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67

for rehabilitation and coping with drug and alcohol abuse. These groups
tended to conceive of Islam in terms of nationalism, racism, and other beliefs
68
and practices. And it was these very racial and political dimensions of their
philosophies that proved attractive to African-American inmates, and led to a
significant Islamic presence in prisons.
As they reached a critical mass, incarcerated Muslims began making
important contributions to the jurisprudence of prison law. In these years,
Muslim inmates increasingly turned to courts to establish Islam as a legitimate
religion, to redress conditions of confinement, and to advance prisoners'
rights.69 Prior to much of this litigation that inaugurated in the 1960s, courts
rarely intervened on behalf of prisoners on the basis of the Eighth
Amendment's freedom from cruel and unusual punishment or the First
Amendment's free exercise clauses. That approach, known as the "hands off'
doctrine, limited federal judicial interference in state correctional systems from
the early to mid-1900s. 70 The hands-off era effectively allowed states to deny
Muslims the right to practice their religion, and in the early 1960s, places like
California, although generally accommodating of prisoners' religious activities,
still did not extend such policies to Muslim prisoners.7 1
This situation began to change through a number of court decisions, which
collectively established Islam as a legitimate religion in prison. 72 The most
important early decision was Fulwood v. Clemmer in 1962, which held that the
Muslim faith must be recognized as a religion.73 This case set the stage for
other legal battles involving Muslim plaintiffs, including the first modem
prisoners' rights case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, Cooper v. Pate, where a
Muslim inmate won a ruling that state prisoners have standing to sue in federal
court under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 74 Over the next several years, cases
involving Muslim prisoners succeeded in gaining recognition of a variety of
75
protections.
67.
68.
69.

C. ERIC LINCOLN, THE BLACK MUSLIMS INAMERICA 24-25 (1961).
ROBERT DANNIN, BLACK PLGRIMAGE TO ISLAM

169-70 (2002).

AMINAH BEVERLY MCCLOUD, AFRICAN AMERICAN ISLAM 123-24 (1995).

LYNN S. BRANHAM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND POLICY OF
70.
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 463 (2009).

71.
Sarah E. Vallely, Criminals Are All the Same: Why Courts Need to Hold Prison
Officials Accountable for Religious Discrimination Under the Religious Land Use and
InstitutionalizedPersons Act, 30 HAMLINE L. REv. 193, 195-96 (2007).
72.
See In re Ferguson, 361 P.2d 417, 422 (Cal.1961); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d
196, 197 (4th Cir. 1961); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1961).
206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962).
73.
74.
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964).
75.
Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (finding inmates
possessed right to receive copies of the NOI publication, Muhammad Speaks, as well as
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Muslims litigating for religious freedom, like other inmates, have grown
accustomed to defeat more than anything. For example, in some settings,
different denominations are denied separate worship space, 76 denied numerous
religious accommodations 77 and have practical difficulties accessing Islamic
chaplains and Islamic services. 8
These and other legal struggles established Islam as a legitimate religion
among both prison officials and prisoners,79 and put Muslims at the center of
administrative and legal reform movements aimed at achieving greater
constitutional protections for prisoners.8o Muslim inmates' use of courts
continues in the present as evinced in a report, which found that Muslim
inmates submitted the largest number of religious discrimination complaints of
any religious group between 2005 and 2007; initiated the largest number of
federal lawsuits under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

enjoining prison facilities to make at least one copy of the Quran available to inmates in their
respective libraries); Sewell, 291 F.2d at 198 (finding prisoners were entitled to hearing for
claims of punishment due to religion); Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27, 30 (E.D. Va.
1964) (finding inmates had right to hold religious services); Coleman v. D.C. Comm'rs, 234
F. Supp. 408, 409 (E.D. Va. 1964) (finding right to possess and wear religious medals).
76.
Jennifer K. Beaudry, Islamic Sectarianism in United States Prisons: The
Religious Right of Shi'a Inmates to Worship Separately from their Sunni Inmates, 35
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1833, 1834 (2007).
77.
See, e.g., Gooden v. Crain, 405 F. Supp. 2d 714, 722, 724 (E.D. Tex. 2005)
(prohibiting inmate from wearing beard longer than one-quarter inch); Hammons v. Saffle,
348 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2003) (denying inmate's access to prayer oils); Couch v.
Jabe, 479 F. Supp. 2d 569, 580 (W.D. Va. 2006) (inmate barred from celebrating Eid ul
Fitr); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 2006) (inmate prohibited from
participating in Ramadan worship for breaking fast).
78.
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 2006) (inmate forced to choose
between access to Islamic services or access to the law library; inmate denied access to an
Islamic chaplain and denied participation in holiday services while in disciplinary custody);
Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (inmate penalized for
attending Muslim services); Religious Discrimination and Prisoners' Rights: Hearing
Before the Bd. on Religious Discriminationand Prisoners' Rights of the U.S. Comm'n on
Civil Rights 102 (Feb. 8, 2008) (statement of Imam Abu Qadir Al-Amin, Head, United
Model Muslim Communities of America and Imam, San Francisco Muslim Community
Center).
79. James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners' Rights Movement and its Impacts, 1960-80, 2
CRIME & JUST. 429, 434-35 (1980).
80.

KATHLEEN

M.

MOORE,

AL-MUGHTARIBUN:

AMERICAN

LAW

AND

THE

TRANSFORMATION OF MUSLIM LIFE INTHE UNITED STATES 80 (1995); Christopher E. Smith,

Black Muslims and the Development of Prisoners' Rights, 24 J. BLACK STUD. 131, 132
(1993).

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

52

[Vol. 49:1

from 2001 to 2006; and made the largest number of religious accommodation
requests from 1997 to 2008.
More recently, a 2013 Department of Justice (DOJ) report documented
how Muslims in federal prison continue to deal with grievances through
administrative channels. 8 2 These complaints by Muslim inmates offer not just a
further example of Muslims using legal recourse to deal with grievances, but
also a glimpse of the institution's role in perpetuating radicalism among
inmates.
The report assesses the implementation of section 1001 of the USA Patriot
Act, which provides a legal remedy for civil rights violations by employees of
the DOJ. The pertinent part of the statute reads: "The Inspector General of the
Department of Justice shall designate one official who shall ... review
information and receive complaints alleging abuses of civil rights and civil
liberties by employees and officials of the Department of Justice."83 According
to that report, between July 1, 2012 and December 31, 2012, the Department of
Justice, Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified a total of six complaints
by federal inmates, all of whom were Muslims.84 The OIG investigated one
directly and referred five to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for further
investigation. The direct investigation involved a BOP inmate who alleged
that correctional officers harassed inmates, threw their Ramadan religious
meals into the garbage, and uttered "racial slurs."86
Among the cases referred to the BOP for further investigation was a BOP
inmate who complained of discrimination. The inmate alleged that the
institution does not employ a Muslim chaplain, that Muslims face a hostile
environment at the institution, and that inmates at the same prison have
previously filed similar complaints of harassment, retaliation, and
discrimination. In another case, a BOP inmate alleged that a correctional
officer engaged in a pattern of "racist and discriminatory behavior" toward
Muslims, "harassing them, 'trashing' their cells, and repeatedly singling them
out for cell searches."88 Another case involved three BOP inmates who alleged

81.

U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENFORCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN PRISON

(2008).
82.

69,81

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 6-11 (2013)

[hereinafter 2013 OIG Report].
83.
USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 56-107, § 1001(3), 115 Stat. 272.
84.
2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 5-7.
85.
2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 5.
86. 2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 6.
87. 2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 6.
88. 2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 6.
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that two correctional officers acted unprofessionally, one by making comments
about "killing Muslims when he was overseas" and the other by comparing
Muslims to dogs and stating that he "hated dogs." 89
The report also details pending investigations opened during previous
reporting periods, in what amounts to more of the same story of Muslims
complaining about their treatment at the hands of government officials. Among
the five cases, one Muslim inmate alleged that a BOP chaplain accused him of
"starting a terrorist cell," which resulted in the inmate's placement in solitary
confinement.90 Another case involved a BOP inmate who alleged that a
correctional officer used a racial slur, confiscated his religious headdress, and
called the headdress a "terrorist cap." 9' Yet another BOP inmate alleged,
among other complaints, that BOP staff tampered with his legal mail,
obstructed calls to his attorneys, censured his participation during Islamic
services and studies, and inappropriately classified him as an "international
terrorist"; the inmate also singled out a BOP lieutenant who told him that
prison staff "hated him."92
Those cases and complaints, along with the legal history of Islam in prison,
show Muslim inmates as frontrunners for advancing prisoners' rights by relying
on courts, over extremist violence, to deal with conditions of confinement.
Simultaneously, the complaints implicate prisons themselves as a factor for
fomenting dissent from harsh and oppressive conditions and treatment at the
hands of staff.
B.

Penaland CulturalImpacts

Like the impact Muslims have had on prison law, the practical impact of
the religion on the lives of inmates and prison culture is unmistakable. The
religion offers a set of practices and doctrines for inmates, including the
proclamation of faith, prayer, charity, and fasting, among other traditional and
non-traditional pieties. These practices help develop discipline and structure in
individuals whose lives are characterized by chaos and instability, teaching
selflessness in a world of self-interest. In turn, inmates refer to Islam through
many images, including as a "lifeboat" that saved a life, or as a "sword" that
cuts through "ignorance and repression," "eye drops for those with irritated
eyes."93 One Latino convert at Folsom State Prison in California explained
Islam's meaning for prisoners: "For those that are serious and involved in the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 6.
2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 7.
2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 7.
2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 8.
Letter from a Prisoner to Author (Dec. 18, 2005) (on file with author).

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

54

[Vol. 49:1

greater Jihad (Struggle of Self), Islam is an anchor to a world that is lost to us
behind these cement walls and iron bars. It offers love and hope, and most of
all, peace that comes when one surrenders to Allah." 94
It is not uncommon for inmates to interpret and understand their
imprisonment within an Islamic framework. This is possible due to the fact that
prisons and penance both have a place in Islam. As one Muslim chaplain notes,
"A cursory review of the acknowledged intentions of Islam and the Quaker
reformists shows that it is apparent the objective of both religious ideologies is
to instill penitence in the criminal." One scholar notes prisons were not
unfamiliar in the Quran, and are mentioned at least nine times as an
institution.96 In the centuries following the founding of Islam, prisons would
become more widely used within Islamic governance. Called "nafi'a," or
"beneficent," the goal of punishment was intended to "benefit" the prisoner.97
Hence, there is considerable overlap with this concept and "penance," which
informed the creation of penitentiaries in European Catholic traditions and later
Protestant varieties in the United States. Just how many inmates make these
connections is uncertain, but some inmates recognize the importance of
imprisonment in religious narrative, as one African-American convert from San
Quentin State Prison writes, "We must retain in mind that nearly all of the
primordial Imams of Ahl Al-Bayt (the household of the Prophet) were
imprisoned or under house arrest by the prevailing anti-Hashimite authorities of
the time."98
Islam's practical value in prison links to a strong emphasis on communal
worship and diversity of denominations. Islam offers inmates something
different from what Christian reformers envisioned in cloistered reflection or
silent prayer. The practices are better suited for building social networks, and as
one scholar asserts, "The greater the capacity of the prison jamaat to establish
the privilege of congregational prayer, the greater the potential effect on the
Muslim."9 9 The communal worship, egalitarianism, and positive identity
construction all serve to support moral and social discipline in inmates,
upholding Quran institutions, encouraging a rigorous program of study and
prayer, and offering a "counter disciplinary resistance" to the hierarchies that

94.

Letter from a Prisoner to Author (Dec. 5, 2005) (on file with author).

95.

MIKAL HUDA BA'TH, ISLAM IN PRISONS:
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96.

See Nawal H. Ammar, Restorative Justice in Islam: Theory and Practice,in THE
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define prison culture.100 For some, it offers a regime to resist American culture
in general, particularly "Black Muslim" organizations, which have effectively
captured the attention of those who have experienced racial oppression. For
others who fall into Sunni circles, there is a very different effect of faith, and
there is scriptural emphasis on equality and belief in God and righteous
conduct, not skin color, nationality or political creed. 0 1 This practical
orientation, which supports ties both inside and outside prison, is cited as
particularly suited for individuals in an environment where racial tensions run
high. 0 2 Still for others whose piety flows to Sufi forms of the tradition, inmates
whose lives are laced with violence cultivate pacifism and non-violent
principles. Taken wholly, the results are significant, according to one Muslim
inmate at the Stafford Creek Corrections Center in Washington state, who
describes the long-term effects of commitment to Islam as "wholly positive and
liberating despite the anti-Islam rhetoric we hear so much of in the West."' 0 3
According to such testimony, Islamic values and mores converge with
desired penal outcomes on multiple levels, including conversion itself. As a
process that involves turning away from previous aspects of one's life, for
some, conversion represents the shedding of one's identification as a criminal
or gang member. As one inmate from Pelican Bay State Prison described, "I
have seen people who were so confused about their present situation
(incarceration) that they would victimize each other. But . .. many of them
have rehabilitated themselves. These men are now ready to be laced back on
the street to keep another generation from coming into prisons.
Sometimes an inmate's conversion to Islam impacts the very inmates who
witness the transformation. According to veteran prison-preacher Imam
Muhammad Abdullah of Taif Tul Islam in Los Angeles, when other prisoners
witness the transformative impact of a conversion, this has profound
consequences on those inmates: "[T]he discipline that Islam requires and
cleanliness, are really admired by people ... this begins a conversion of many
because they are either living with their former crime partner(s) and they knew
100.

DANNIN, supra note 68, at 177.

101. See, e.g., Quran Chapter 49, Verse 13, ("0 men! Behold, We have createdyou all
out of a male and afemale, and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might
come to know one another." ISLAMICITY, http://bit.ly/M60s9q (last visited Sept. 13, 2013));
Abdullah Antepli, The Last Sermon of the Prophet Muhammad, HUFFINGTON PosT (Feb. 3,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/imam-abdullah-antepli/the-last-sermon-of-prophe
b_1252185.html.
102. See JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE. B. KATZENBACH, THE VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT: A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE
IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 23 (2006).

103.
104.
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his or their past and to see that person or people change right before their very
eyes is enough for anyone to see there must be a just god."105 Research
supports that such transformations have a strong impact on others, as one study
noted, "When people say that they feel peace or that they have found freedom
help but be swayed by the
within their imprisonment, any listener 10cannot
6
obvious emotion with which they speak.,
Although there is need for further research on Islam's influences on
inmates, the available scholarship points to positive links between Islam and
inmate rehabilitation. One of the earliest studies of Islamic beliefs in prisons in
the 1960s claimed that recovering alcoholics and drug-addicts were able to
cope in prison more effectively after converting to Islam.' 07 A 1978 study
found that the NOI helped inmates with morale, discipline, and
rehabilitation. os According to one scholar, the religion's attraction is in helping
inmates transcend the material and often brutally inhumane conditions of
prison.109 Other research describes Muslims as a "stabilizing force in many
prisons,""10 often assuming leadership roles in periods of crisis."' Some other
examples include a study of U.S. prisons between 1971 and 1986, which found
that Muslims did not participate in a single riot during the fifteen-year span of
the study.'1 2 Rather, Muslim inmates mitigated violence and deaths in both the
Attica (1971) and Sing Sing (1983) prison riots." 3 Islam is also reported to
improve inmates' prison adjustment, self-esteem,"l 4 and reformatory

105. Email from Muhammad Abdullah to Author (October 25, 2005, 22:50:16 PDT)
(on file with author).
106. Todd R. Clear et al., The Value ofReligion in Prison, 16 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST.
53, 62 (2000).
107.
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108. Keith Butler, Muslims Are No Longer an Unknown Quantity, CORRECTIONS
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dissertation, Northern Illinois University) (on file with author).

2013/14]

MUSLIM RADICALIZATION IN PRISON

57

potential,' 5 as well as reduce recidivism rates more than other groups
statewide' and nationwide. 1"
For decades, African-American activists have commented on Islam's
appeal among African-Americans inside prison walls." 8 Malcolm X's story
illustrates the point when, as a prisoner, he was struck by the idea that his
forbearers were a race of "ancient civilizations" with "riches in gold and
kings," thoughts he describes as "the first serious thoughts" that he had ever
had in his life." 9 The turning point for Malcolm X was crucial, since it
connected him culturally to something bigger than he had ever known.
As it did for Malcolm X, Islamic history forges a pathway for AfricanAmericans to reconnect with their Islamic roots and Arabic language. Malcolm
X looked to American history as a pathway through which inmates could
understand their Islamic heritage, since Muslims were among those enslaved
and brought to America from Africa. Further back, to the very beginning, is the
religious narrative of the figure Bilal, a companion of the Prophet Muhammad.
Although Bilal was African and a former slave, the Prophet chose him to call
Muslims to pray for the very first time, a story that proclaims Islam's
commitment to equality.120
These ancient cultural links support a rich tradition of conversion to Islam
in modem America. Islamic preaching in North America among AfricanAmericans traces to the early 1900s, when groups like the Moorish Science
Temple, the NOI, and the Ahmadiyya movements began focusing their
115.
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Inmate Culture: The HistoricalDevelopment of Islam in American Corrections, RELIGION,
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availableat http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/johnson.html.
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attention on outreach to African-Americans.121 These efforts produced some of
the most prominent leaders in African-American history, including Noble Drew
Ali, Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm X, Warith Deen Muhammad, and Louis
Farrakhan. And they helped make famous the story of conversion to Islam in
prison, from the persona of Mike Tyson to hip hop songs, to television series
like the Chappelle Show, the Boondocks, and Oz.
Perhaps like no other cultural medium, hip-hop music has created inroads
for Islam within African-American cultures, including those in prison.1 22
Indeed, the history of hip-hop culture is one intimately connected to Islam and
radicalization. After all, it was the "godfather" of hip hop, Afrika Bambaataa,
who by all accounts was radicalized from the gang life into promoting nonviolence. Having turned his back on the gang life, he made "peace, unity, love
and having fun" one of hip-hop's main mantras. Beyond Bambaataa, some of
the most influential hip-hop artists of all time have identified themselves with
Islam; from Rakim to Public Enemy to Mos Def and the Wu-Tang Clan, hiphop music has transmitted Islamic themes, symbols, and language to AfricanAmericans. At the extreme end of the spectrum, some of the music has been
described "jihadi rap," 23 "verbal mujahideen" or soldiers in what rapper Paris
calls "sonic jihad."l 24
Given how Islam connects inmates to their African and African-American
heritage, it is hardly cultural apostasy for African-Americans to convert to
Islam, since doing so takes them to the very heart of Africa. It is for this reason
that some describe their turn to Islam not as conversion, but as reversion-nota
turn to the faith, but a return-a re-connecting and reclaiming of an uprooted
past. As one African-American inmate describes, "Islam encourages
togetherness, prayer, and aspects of morality that would, literally, awe the
average Westerner. Islam encourages family adhesiveness and history . .. and
gave me the encouragement to identify with Africa."l 25
Latinos adopt a similar cultural logic and embrace Islam as a way of
reconnecting to their Spanish heritage. Although data on Latino conversion is
sparse, and even less is known about conversion in prison, some studies
confirm its occurrence. 2 For Latinos, the draw of Islam is perhaps unlike that
121. See Spearlt, Raza Islamica: Prisons, Hip Hop & Converting Converts, 22
L.J. 175, 178-179 (2012) (in addition was Duse Mohamed Ali's
Universal Islamic Society in Detroit) [hereinafter Raza Islamica].
122. See generally id. at 177.
123. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Jihadi Rap, FRONTPAGE MAG.COM (Nov. 10, 2004),
availableat http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=10635.
124. PARIS, SONIC JIHAD (Guerilla Funk 2003).
125. Letter from a Prisoner to Author (Dec. 1, 2005) (on file with author).
126. See, e.g., HAMM, supra note 30, at 42, 68.
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of any other religion due to historical factors similar to those that define the
African-American experience. As the term "Moor" was embraced by various
African-American leaders to unite the poor and disenfranchised with Islam, the
Latino embrace of Moorish Spain provides a powerful tool to re-imagine
identity. As one Mexican-American convert from Huntsville Unit, a prison in
Texas, described: "When I learned 'ojala' (God willing) was from Arabic, I
saw the truth about Hispanics and Islam. I've heard my parents say that a
thousand times, but never really thought about it. Now I know and tell others
that Mexicans got Islam in their blood."127
Highlighting the positive impacts of embracing Islam inside prison walls,
however, should not ignore certain negative outcomes. For example, as one
African-American convert describes, "There are no incentives (worldly) to
embracing Islam in the prison system, especially since the aftermath of Sept.
11th, and subsequent events which only cast a negative image upon Islam, but
have led the U.S. government to view Muslim prisoners as potential
terrorists.",12 8 Yet, the hardships that may be involved with accepting Islam
does not stop inmates from converting. The consequences have their own set of
ramifications, including having to live with the adverse effects. For example,
one African-American convert asserts, "In the bible belt families have been
known to disown their loved ones inside because they embrace Islam."l 29
Writing from Union Correctional Institute in Florida, he describes, "[W]ith all
the negative which comes with prisoners embracing Islam, they continue to
come to 30
Islam at a steady pace, knowing that it will likely only make their time
harder."'
Other adverse consequences of accepting Islam run along ethnic lines, and
inmates who convert are at risk from members of their own ethnic group. As
indicated by one Native-American convert from Corcoran State Prison, "When
a non-African-American accepts Islam such as myself, I opened up a very
dangerous door that could lead to physical and verbal abuse bye [sic] fellow
Native-Americans because I accepted Islam."'' His troubles resound with
those expressed by a Latino ex-prisoner who himself was not Muslim, but
described seeing a Latino convert to Islam who was "dealt with in a horrible
way."132 As these individuals convey, embracing Islam comes with a price tag,
sometimes even violence. The overarching conclusion suggests the benefits of
Islam outweigh the harms and negatives associated with becoming Muslim.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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Gaps in Chaplaincy

The lifeblood of Islam in prison is in social networks, both inside and
outside. Yet in recent years, policy decisions have produced shortages in
Islamic leadership, threatening these very networks. Despite that Muslim
inmates have well-developed support structures and resources, there remain
shortages of Islamic leadership to service the growth of inmates who turn to
Islam. Scarce resources and shortages have made prisoner imams the most
viable source of leadership since they come at no cost and in some cases may
be more grounded practically because, as prisoners, they live with inmates
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, compared to only weekly or
monthly visits from outside imams. Unfortunately, these circumstances often
leave the pulpit open to individuals with a radical agenda, as was noted by the
Office of the Inspector General, who described that in federal prisons, inmates
were "much more likely to lead their own religious services, distort Islam,
advocate Prison Islam, and espouse extremist beliefs." 1 3 3 Al-Muhajair, who
claims to have served as his prison's "imam and amir of education," offers an
ominous picture from his own pulpit: "With my love for America," he writes
sarcastically, "what do you think I am teaching young Muslims?"l 3 4
Shortages in Islamic chaplaincy occur at both the federal and state level.
The problem was recognized in a 2004 government report on the BOP, which
highlighted a critical shortage of Muslim chaplains. 135 Citing the Chief of the
Chaplaincy Services Branch's definition of a critical shortage as "1 chaplain of
a certain faith for every 700 inmates of that faith BOP-wide"; at the time of the
report's issuance, there was one Muslim chaplain for every 900 Muslim
inmates.' 36 Two years later, an official at the BOP noted, "[A] substantial
portion of Islamic services [was] being led by inmates." 3 7 The shortage had
adverse outcomes, including offering space for more extreme versions of Islam,
as described by one Muslim inmate's testimony, "I've been to one prison in
which there was no government hired chaplain. Our imam was a fellow
prisoner and we were virtually unsupervised by prison authorities.. . . Prisoner
imams are mavericks. They usually are unafraid to speak their minds-even
when their speech involves public condemnation of government foreign or
domestic policy."l38 This inmate's definition sounds like a description of alMuhajair, a prisoner-imam with strong opinions: "Americans believe by
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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starving one belief and shoving another down inmates' throats they are saving
America. I am pissed, and I feel it is doing the exact opposite."' 3 9
As al-Muhajair's words suggests, the leadership vacuum may be filled with
radical elements, which is particularly ironic given that the leadership shortage
was created in the name of containing radicalization. In reality, it created space
for extremism to ferment within the prison. This situation perhaps explains why
there has been little evidence of success of a wider effort by overseas Muslim
groups successfully propagating extremism in prison. Indeed, evidence from
media outletsl 4 0 and federally funded academic studies indicate there has been
no mass effort to propagate extremism in prison from Islamic networks
abroad.141 Current studies point out that attempts to promote extremism in
prisons are predominantly made by prisoners who are already inside the penal
facility or through other networks, particularly, prison gang networks. 142 The
shortage of Muslim leaders threatens to compromise prison security and
increase the risk of proliferating ideological extremism within prisons.14 3
The situation in state prisons is equally problematic, and according to a
recent survey of prison chaplains across the United States, fifty-five percent of
all individuals surveyed said that the most underserved religious group in
prison is Muslims. 144 As a result of this disparity, much, if not most, of the
development for Islamic religious programming and education ends up falling
on the shoulders of other inmates, non-Muslim chaplains, and prison officials
who frequently lack basic understanding about Islamic beliefs and practices,
compounded by staffs that typically have few Muslims.145
These forced developments in localized leadership, however, are not
always necessarily negative outcomes; indeed, one could argue that such
influence is potentially positive. After all, inmate leaders living in the
institution are more in touch with inmates' daily experiences than individuals
who visit relatively briefly from the outside. The lack of trained leadership,
139. Letter from Prisoner, supra note 1, at 3.
140. Rachel Zoll, American Prisons Become Political,Religious Battleground Over
Islam, AsSOCIATED PRESS (June 4, 2005), http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/nation/
20050604-0928-struggleforislamii.html.
141. Hamm, supra note 18, at 681; see, e.g., 2011 House Hearing, supra note 3, at
228-31 (statement of Patrick Dunleavy, retired Deputy Inspector, Criminal Intelligence Unit,
New York Department of Correctional Services, citing the congressional testimony by Dr.
Bert Useem).
142. Hamm, supra note 18, at 682.
143. HSPI & CIAG REPORT, supra note 10, at 14 ("The inadequate number of Muslim
religious services providers increases the risk of radicalization."); OIG REPORT, supra note
10, at 2-3.
144. PEW SURVEY, supra note 21.
145. Hamm, supra note 18, at 678.

62

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1

however, renders the religion at perpetual risk of being guided by inmates who
can hardly deliver authoritative spiritual guidance. More critically, it allows
individuals to exploit the pulpit, depart from traditional teachings, and even
propagate an extremist agenda.
This pattern was evident in the only documented case of prison-based
Islamic extremist violence in the post-9/11 era: the Jam'yyat Al-Islam AlSaheeh (JIS). The group was conceived in the vacuum of Islamic religious
authority inside New Folsom State Prison, where an intelligent and charismatic
twenty-six-year-old preacher, named Kevin Lamar James, led and successfully
recruited members into the JIS due to his "claimed special expertise as a
representative and legitimate voice for Islam."l 4 6 As the chaplain of New
Folsom Prison explains, "Chaplains were too busy to help with any serious
religious conversions due to the overcrowding problem here. For the prisoners
who converted to Islam, we had to rely mainly on volunteers."l 4 7
The overcrowded nature of prisons described by the chaplain increases
prospects for violence, which is not limited to New Folsom. According to the
Department of Justice's 2008-2009 National Inmate Survey, there were 25,312
male prisoner-on-prisoner assaults,1 48 a figure that indicates inmates are
approximately fifty times more likely to face assault in prison than outside it.14 9
Therefore, there are times when the influence of social networks expands
beyond assisting inmates with their spiritual and physical well-being. Taking
shelter in Islam may be a simple strategy to survive and garner protection
against other inmates and prison staff. As one federal prisoner from Terminal
Island notes:
[A]ssociating yourself with some click [sic] in prison is very important
because it gives you a sense of security and an alliance which you can
build strong bonds with. The reality of prison is that you cannot
survive without the help of others. If you isolate yourself from others,
you will most likely be taken advantage of and be placed in harm's
150
way.
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It is impossible to deny that protection-based motives cause some prisoners
to turn to Islam. One inmate explains that offering protection is simply a part of
being in a Muslim brotherhood: "Some brothers were born Muslim, and chose
the street life over Muslim life only to return to it once entering the system,
because with the Muslims there is a sense of structure, order, purpose, and
some just seek a sense of protection, which is what we are here for."151
Sometimes a person who enters Islam out of self-interest will end up keeping
the faith, as one inmate who converted in a Los Angeles County jail describes:
"Although I entered Islam with an ulterior motive, my heart was already open
to God and Allah is slowly but surely purifying my mind and spirit." 5 2 His
words suggest that even if an inmate joins Islam for physical protection, it is no
barrier to developing faith. However, such motivations should not be
exaggerated, as one ex-gang member writes from prison, "These days when
asked if one became Muslim for protection, the retort is 'yes, for Allah's
protection! "'53
The lack in chaplaincy also means that, as a rule of thumb, some of those
who step up will be from gang backgrounds.1 54 One scholar describes
conversion among gang members to groups like the NOI and Five Percent
Nation of Islam as "[g]angland [g]angstas [t]uming Gods."" 5 This
phenomenon undoubtedly gives Muslim organizations the appearance of gang
affiliation to prison officials. As one convert in a Missouri state prison
lamented, "Since 9/11 we have been viewed as a 'gang,' and are being
constantly investigated for possible al-Qaeda ties."' 5 6
At present, little is known about Islam's impact on gang culture, and little
is mentioned in social science studies about the influence of religion in a
youth's ability to leave a gang.157 One researcher has suggested that religion
functions similarly "to gang affiliation and the need to connect to other
people."' 58 Despite the gap in research, it is clear that many who are now lawabiding Muslims were once gang members, as detailed by one AfricanAmerican prisoner who writes, "When an individual wants to leave the gang
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life, most likely he enters into this community. He knows that we will support
him and assist him put his life in order. It is not unusual to see gang members
become ex-gang members." 5 9 The turn from gangs is complex, yet as another
inmate attests, "I believe the fact that young men in gangs are often primed for
Islam as a result of the hardships they endure in their youth. Once in prison
they are under no illusion about the American Dream .... Most young men in
gangs come from impoverished homes with enormous voids in their lives and
Islam brings substance to their lives." 60 Unfortunately, however, as the next
section shows, in prison this is not always the message spread in the name of
Islam.
IV. RADICALIZATION IN PRISON
This part of the article analyzes what prisoners themselves identify as
causal factors for radicalization. Their testimony suggests that prisoner
radicalization is grounded more in domestic problems, and less in recruiting
efforts of foreign operatives or jihadist networks. For example, according to
Mark S. Hamm, overcrowding is a primary institutional-level cause of prisoner
extremism, which among other outcomes, results in chaplain understaffing and
gang dominance over increasingly populated physical spaces.161 At the
organizational level, what Hamm describes as "charismatics," typically from a
gang background, are the primary instigators of extremism, who derive some of
their influence by dint of their credibility among other prisoners.162 The lack of
a strong and qualified Muslim religious authority results in services being led
by untrained leaders whose credentials lack religious authenticity. 163 Prisongang proselytizing thus represents a primary individual-level cause of inmate
extremism, which is so prevalent that Hamm has asserted, "The prisoner
radicalization problem cannot be separated from the prison gang problem."1 64
A.

The Fertile Soil ofJihad?

Post-9/11 discourse on terrorism and radicalization was built on a binary,
"us versus them" paradigm, with "them" representing foreign enemies.
Although the individuals stated to have been involved in the attacks of
September 11th were foreigners, the binary quickly was challenged by growing
159.
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evidence that Americans could become jihadists without the influence of
foreigners. Inmates express radical attitudes in various rhetorical schemes such
as labeling the "USA" the "United Snakes of America," adopting the spelling
"AmeriKKKa," or affixing postage stamps with the American flag upside down
to indicate a state of emergency. Does such sentiment indicate that prisons are
special spaces for growing violent jihadists?
Notwithstanding the incriminations, the idea that foreigners are at the root
of radicalization has become the bedrock of much political analysis
surrounding prisons. At the first round of congressional hearings in 2003,
Senator Jon Kyl's opening comment makes the point, asserting that to defeat
"terrorists," we must understand their goals and methods "as well as they
understand our system of freedom."' 65 This statement, of course, implied that
the threat was not American but foreign, particularly indicated by his use of the
phrase "our system of freedom." Likewise, in the 2006 hearings, Chairman
Collins's opening statement described the "rise of domestic terrorist cells" that
are inspired by al-Qaeda. 16 6 This theme extended into the last round of hearings
in 2011 with Chairman Peter King's opening statement, which defended the
hearings as a response to "Al Qaida's announced intention to intensify attacks
within the United States"167 Later in the hearings, Representative King
defended the focus on Muslim inmates along similar lines, "If we find out that
neo-Nazis ally with a foreign power and they are coming to this country, we
will investigate it." 168 Of course, implicit in these comments is the idea that the
influence is coming from "foreign powers," as Representative King put it,
rather than from forces at home.
Although the relationship between prisons and violent extremism in post-9/
11 America proves tenuous at best, there are still many misconceptions. For
example, one widely cited policy report on Muslim extremism, Out of the
Shadows: Getting Ahead of PrisonerRadicalization, ominously described the

phenomenon as "a threat of unknown magnitude." 69 This characterization,
however, is misleading, since religious violence emanating from prison has
been quite the exception. Even in general, terrorist threats against the United
States from "homegrown" American Muslim supporters of "jihadi" ideology
tend to be few. As one terrorism analyst at the RAND Corporation noted in a
2010 study, out of more than three million Muslims in the United States, only a
few more than 100 have joined jihad, "suggesting an American-Muslim

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

2003 Senate Hearing,supra note 3, at 2.
2006 Senate Hearing,supranote 3, at 1.
2011 House Hearing,supra note 3, at 204.
2011 House Hearing,supra note 3, at 266.
HSPI & CIAG REPORT, supra note 10, at i.

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

66

[Vol. 49:1

population that remains hostile to jihadist ideology and its exhortations to
violence." 170
Focusing on the prison population, evidence shows the number of cases in
which an inmate or recent inmate was involved in terrorist activity is extremely
small. In the global context, one study identified forty-six cases out of tens of
thousands of terrorist attacks "in which a stretch in prison contributed to a
radicalization process, leading eventually to a terrorist attack or threat against
Western targets between 1968 and 2009."' In the United States, there has
been little terrorist activity involving Muslim inmates. According to a
Congressional Research Service (CRS) study, of fifty-three identified terror
plots of "[h]omegrown violent jihadist activity," only one case, the JIS,
definitively involved violent extremism that was connected to a U.S. prison.172
These statistics have led one commentator to suggest that if prisons are
producing terrorists like a factory, "they are doing a terrible job." 7 3
Furthermore, in 2007, the FBI conducted over 2,088 terrorism threat
assessments in prisons and jails across the United States and "determined that
there was not a JIS-like pattern of terrorist recruitment in U.S. prisons ....
Indeed, the FBI could find no pattern of terrorist recruitment whatsoever."' 74
B.

PrisonerPerceptions

In his letter to Representative King, al-Muhajair illuminates what has
propelled him to become an "enemy of the United States": "Iwill spare you all
the reasons, except to mention ... cowardly bombing of Muslim women and
children in a sovereign nation ... thirty billion a year to Israel in weapons to
kill Muslims, genocide of civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan, human rights
violations at Gitmo, I am sure you get the point."' 75
Disaffection from government polices abroad and at home is common
among Muslim inmates. In al-Muhajair's case, feelings of anger and alienation
led him to renounce his citizenship, only to be ignored by the government. He
claims to have sent "letter after letter to the INS Dep[artment] of State all in
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accordance with 8 USCS 1481 (A)(6)." 7 This particular statute affords a
citizen the opportunity to renounce citizenship. Yet, al-Muhajair claims that his
letters never got a response. He marvels at the government's laxity: "[H]ow is it
a right given to me by Congress of the United States can be voided by [a]gency
in-action?"17
More ominously, however, al-Muhajair points to the
consequences of his treatment, "Seems the [Department] of [S]tate doesn't
know what happens when you corner a badger." 78 His statements offer insight
into inmate extremism and suggest there is plenty of fuel for radicalization at
home-prison radicals need no proselytizing from foreigners-they are fully
capable of radicalizing other inmates on their own.179 This is obvious in alMuhajair's letter, which laments, "I don't understand why it is ignored. The
holy [Q]uran gives one a choice of fight or flight, why does America want me
to fight? I will die for Allah, what land will it be on?"180
1. Criminal Justice Critiques
From the days of Malcolm X to the present, Muslims invoke the criminal
justice system as a major source of oppression against the poor, minorities, and
Muslims themselves. This tradition continues and inmates hold deep animus
from their experiences in criminal justice at all levels-cops, courts, and
corrections. Regarding the latter, one Muslim prisoner in California describes
the environment itself as causing one to seek survival over all: "Prisons are the
only means by which man can legally enslave another man, so it is not difficult
to see that there is and are ulterior motives for the crafty to keep men down and
willing to do whatever to get ahead in this ruthless environment."' 81 Similar
invective was expressed by an elderly African-American prisoner who voiced
his disdain for the prison system by unfailingly signing all his letters with "Free
the oppressed (90:11-13)."82
Particular tensions for Muslim prisoners arise from negative interactions
with prison guards, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. In Malcolm X's days,
176. Letter from Prisoner, supra note 1.
177. Letter from Prisoner, supra note 1.
178. Letter from Prisoner, supra note 1.
179. Hamm, supra note 18, at 674-74.
180. Letter from Prisoner, supra note 1.
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numbers refer to the Quran Surah 90:11-13: "But he hath made no haste on the path that is
steep. And what will explain to thee the path that is steep? It is freeing the bondsman." The
Meaning of the Glorious Quran Text, Italics, & Commentary (Sept. 10, 2013 11:09 AM),
www.islamicbulletin.org/free_downloads/quran/quranyusufali2.pdf
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guards were antagonistic to the point of radicalizing inmates as he recalls, "I
have heard scores of new prisoners swearing back in their cells that when free
their first act would be to waylay those visiting-room guards. Hatred often
focused on them." 8 3 His statement vividly captures the possibility that prison
staff and policy can actually stoke inmate radicalization and perhaps, extremist
violence as well. The same holds true in the present as expressed by an ex-gang
member who cites his own experiences of being placed in solitary confinement.
He used a homemade wick as an incense holder, which he was previously
allowed. "Observing this quite common occurrence a guard who had previously
commented on my religious attire as a 'nightgown' decided that this was some
sort of explosive device, and I was subsequently thrown into ad-seg."' 84
Another inmate, from Union Correctional Institute in Florida adds, "We are
under tremendous pressure and scrutiny due to the War on Terror; guards target
Muslim prisoners for harassment, and sometimes, target other black prisoner
for no other reason than because they think they are Muslim.""' Similar
sentiment was expressed by an African-American convert who describes his
own daydreams of getting even with guards:
It may seem petty and stupid, but after while it's aggravating and
offends the senses when guards just refer to us as "Taliban" or call one
of us "Mohammad." Sometimes I catch myself just fantasizing about
how to settle the score and get back at them . ... [T]here is one guard

in particular-he hates us and it shows. Like I said it's petty, but I'm
just saying what happens.186
Finding irony in the treatment of Muslims by guards, one prisoner from
California State Prison, Corcoran writes, "They always talk about gangs and
Islam as if it's the same thing. But they never once look at how they look with
their boots, badges, and shaved heads. That's pot calling kettle 'black.' 187
Another inmate describes experiences with guards in a California prison: "I
have been harassed, discriminated against, ridiculed, falsely accused and
wrongly placed in ad-seg by a group of guards .... [One guard] openly
ridiculed my Islamic clothing."188 Such treatment leads inmates to other
conclusions, like one California convert who writes, "Muslims, in prison, are
conscious and the system has declared war on us." 89
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Implicit in inmates' views about their treatment at the hands of the justice
system is widespread belief that the deck is stacked against criminal
defendants. One inmate in California describes the severity of the system at
multiple intersections: "I've been incarcerated for 13 years. I received a 20-year
sentence for drug trafficking, and am a first-time offender . . .. I've been to six
different institutions, and of course have been subjected to discrimination for
nothing other than being Muslim, then there's being a convict and being
Black."l 90 Another Muslim inmate described the U.S. government and the
criminal justice system as "accomplices" since, according to him, "All minority
prisoners are 'political prisoners' because under the current emprisonment [sic]
policies established by politicians and government officials, all imprisonment is
substantively political."l91 For others, Islam is a path to recreating one's self by
erasing the iniquities brought on by the justice system, as described by one
African-American inmate:
Muslim converts behind bars are those who come from a gang lifestyle
and frequent run-ins with police and authorities. And in my opinion,
most were subjected to selective justice . . . . [I]f one was arrested and
convicted for robbery, he would be given stiffer punishment if he or
she were black or [L]atino. Islam offers these kinds of people a new
start. A chance to dump their baggage of hate and malice. 92
Of the justice system's branches, for Muslims the overwhelming target of
dissent is the prison system. The sustained criticism is noteworthy and images
are vivid, such as one inmate's account of life for prisoners: "Each and every
day, prisoners are subject to brutality, inhumanity and degradation. Sick
prisoners are allowed to linger days and nights in pain without help and who
eventually die. Prisoners are thrown down stairs while handcuffed ....
Massive psychological torture, and mental illness uncared for, occurs daily in
U.S. prisons."' 93 One African-American convert indicates how such
experiences were deeply linked to his turn to the faith: "[I've] seen almost
every evil that ever could happen within these concentration camp walls, so
brotherhood is just not something I've given into. We are being somewhat
oppressed ... these are all crisis [sic] that people of color face daily. Al-Islam
is the only answer for men, women, and children." 94 Another inmate in
Missouri reiterates the plight for Muslims at his institution: "The Prison

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter

from
from
from
from
from

a Prisoner to author (Nov. 2005) (on file with author).
a prisoner to Author (Apr. 17, 2006) (on file with author).
a Prisoner to Author (Dec. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
a Prisoner to Author (Apr. 17, 2006) (on file with author).
a Prisoner to Author (Nov. 17, 2005) (on file with author).
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Administration here is certainly against us. They do everything in there [sic]
power to oppress us." 1 95
2.

Racial and Religious Discrimination

Related to their experiences in criminal justice is a sense of general
discrimination of Muslims in free society. Al-Muhajair's letter to
Representative King cites such oppression as the catalyst for the "Fort Hood
shooting": "What do Americans expect, 'Major Malik Nadal?' Work on a base
and see everyday Muslims being killed (what did you expect??). I think he is a
hero and I am sorry he ran out of bullets."1 96 Practices of discrimination are
sometimes so pervasive that non-Muslims are subject to hostility simply for
looking like Muslims, as Representative Al Green described at the 2011
hearings: "Iwant you to know that when I board an airplane, I am looked upon
with an eye of suspicion. For some reason people tend to think that I am
Muslim. For some reason, a person told me I needed to go back home to my
foreign country, that I don't belong in this country."1 97
Like the religious discrimination Representative Green relates, inmates
commonly cite experiencing racial inequities in American society and prison.
This may explain in part why groups like the NOI have been successful in
recruiting members-the group speaks to those who experience racism firsthand. For example, Malcolm X's conversion to Islam in prison back in the
1950s was largely based on his attraction to the racial rhetoric, which helped
him conclude: "[A]mong all Negroes the black convict is the98most perfectly
preconditioned to hear the words, 'the white man is the devil."'l
The war on terror is an important symbol of oppression for inmate
perceptions. Whether it be the rounding up of Arab-Americans or non-citizens,
or torture at the Abu-Ghraib and Guantanamo prisons, inmates know first-hand
that the burdens of war are not shouldered equally. The use of "war," both
literally and metaphorically, might encourage a war-like mentality. It might be
little surprise, then, that extremist inmates understand the situation in like
terms, or as al-Muhajair's letter explains, "I am a Muslim, and I feel because of
America's 'war on Islam' I am the enemy of the United States."l 99 In similar
vein, another Muslim inmate adds, "A war is being waged on poor and
195. Letter from a Prisoner to Author (Nov. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
196. Letter from Prisoner, supra note 1.
197. The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that
Community's Response: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong.
1, in COMPILATION OF HEARINGS ON ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION, Ser. No. 112-9 (2011).
198. MALCOLM X, supra note 119, at 199.
199. Letter from Prisoner, supra note 1.
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minority communities across the U.S.. The result of all this warfare has been
the absolute decimation of our communities, and an ongoing SOCIAL
GENOCIDE of people of color. Around the globe we must demand that this
social genocide STOP NOW!"200
V.

CONCLUSION AND FORWARD

The findings of this article lead to telling conclusions that bear on penal
and public policy. Perhaps, the greatest contribution is showing how political
responses to prisoner radicalization are misguided, and based on false data and
flawed analyses. Although less than a handful of Muslim inmates became
involved in terrorist activity in the past decade, the issue has been overblown,
perhaps best evidenced by the fact that there were more congressional hearings
in the last decade on violent extremism among Muslim inmates than actual
instances of it.
A. The Sound of Sirens
Violent extremism among Muslim inmate populations is relatively rare in
the post-9/1 1 era. This fact is noteworthy for policymakers since it provides an
opportunity to reconsider assumptions and perceptions about Islam in prison.
Although some prison systems have adopted aggressive postures toward
Muslim inmates, such heavy-handed policies run the risk of backfiring and
fomenting radicalism, that is, "hysteric and stigmatizing reactions can fuel
radicalization among prisoners and their followers, contributing to the threat
rather than managing it." 20 1 This is a lesson British prison officials have been
learning since their extreme measures at security have inspired greater
resistance among radicals.202
The attempt to shape religious ideology by censorship or otherwise is
203
dangerous, and instead may stoke animosity and fear. More specifically,
Communication Management Units (CMU) are cited as counterproductive and
increasing levels of radicalization since they foster tensions among the different

200. Letter from a Prisoner to Author (Apr. 17, 2006) (on file with author).
201.

RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 432.

202. Al Arabiya, Islamist PrisonersSpread Radicalization in UK Jails,Report Finds,
AL ARABIYA NEWS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/06/
192969.html.
203. Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of
Counter-Radicalization,64 STAN. L. REv. 125, 125 (2012); NEUMANN, supra note 11, at 36.

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

72

[Vol. 49:1

Muslims groups in the units.204 The units have also fostered solidarity and
defiance among the CMU inmates in light of heightening conflicts between
guards and inmates. 205
Current approaches to managing Muslim inmates in post-9/11 America
feign as informed and well intentioned, but according to one scholar, "[T]here
remains a significant lack of careful thinking about the rationales for many
widely-shared prescriptions. Just as troubling, some worry that no attempt has
been made to coordinate the policy prescriptions, resulting in unintended, and
in certain cases counter-productive, consequences."206
Fears about Muslim radicalization in prison have failed to fulfill doomsday
prophecies. There is little extremist violence in the name of religion, and even
less activity that involves the dreaded foreign enemy. Despite the dearth of
evidence to support the myth of jailhouse jihad, Muslim inmates have been
forced to bear the policies that toe this alarmist line. From a penological
perspective, these developments were undesirable since, in some instances, the
policies ended up causing what they sought to prevent.
Still, prisons are extreme and dangerous places particularly suited to
catalyze extremist thought and behavior; 207 yet researchers are indicating that
the risk of radicalization is moderate and falling.208 Generally speaking,
according to reports from the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland
Security 2 09 and the Congressional Research Service (CRS), 210 homegrown
terrorism is declining after a brief spike in the period from 2009 to 2011. By
relative comparison, deaths due to religious extremism is quite rare, and
according to the Triangle Center, since 9/11, there were thirty-three lives lost
due to Muslim-American terrorism in the United States, compared to 150,000
murders committed by Americans in the same period.211 The occurrence of
204. Carrie Johnson & Margot Williams, All Things Considered, "'Guantanamo
North': Inside Secretive U.S. Prisons," (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 3, 2011) available at
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134168714/guantanamo-north-inside-u-s-secretive-prisons.
205. Scott Shane, Beyond Guantanamo, A Web of Prisons for Terrorism Inmates,
NEW YORK TIMES, (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/us/beyondguantanamo-bay-a-web-of-federal-prisons.html?pagewanted=all& r-0.
206. RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 433.
207. HAMM, supra note 30, at 114.
208. Bert Useem & Obie Clayton, Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners, 8 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL. 561, 564 (2009); GARTENSTEIN-Ross & GROSSMAN, supra note 30, at 14-15.
209. CHARLES KURZMAN, MUSLIM-AMERICAN TERRORISM: DECLINING FURTHER
(Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/KurzmanMuslimAmericanTerrorism February 1_2013.pdf.
210.

B.ELOPERA, supra note 30.

211. KURZMAN, supra note 170 (at the time of this Article, there are ongoing criminal
proceedings for the Boston Bombings, which claimed 3 lives, which are not represented in
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terrorist acts in prison, according to the CRS report, is even rarer. CRS notes
the JIS case as the only documented case of a prison-based jihadist plot in the
post-9/11 era. Empirically then, the situation in prison is temperate, and as
some researchers have claimed, "Much of the talk about the risk of
radicalization is simply talk, unsupported by research or evidence."212
B.

CriticalPolicy, Better Practices

According to some scholars, "current claims that prison radicalization has
reached a crisis stage are grossly premature and, at this point, mere
speculation."213 The tenuous relationship between prisons and extremist
violence demands a more rational and balanced approach in institutional and
public policy. Accordingly, the following measures offer data-driven strategies
specifically with the management of Muslim inmates in mind; yet they benefit
the entire prison population. As such, prison administrators might explore how
these strategies are convergent with broader correctional goals, including
ensuring that religious normalcy reigns in and outside prison.
Representative King has publicly stated his intention "to stop prisoners
from being radicalized." 2 14 This is highly unlikely, and aside from whatever
rhetorical value it holds, demonstrates a radical agenda in its own right. For
even under the best-functioning prison systems, prevention of radicalization
will never be possible. This is true partly because prison conditions account for
only some of the will to extremism-but as shown above, many "radicalized"
individuals enter prison with extreme proclivities, including the commission of
crimes using weapons and violence. Hence, given these facts, significant
administrative challenges inside prisons, and the social, political, and economic
issues outside of prisons, calling for a complete halt to radicalization is not only
itself radical, but also unrealistic and legally questionable.2 15
Unrealistic goals produced failed policies like the BOP Standardized
Chapel Library Project. This program sought to inventory all chapel books and
rescreen their permissibility under the BOP's security policies. 216 More
importantly, the project revealed how suppressive tactics may backfire and
antagonize Muslim inmates, rather than achieve its goal of reducing
the figure. See John Eligon & Michaell Cooper, Blasts at Boston Marathon Kill 3 and Injure
100, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/
us/explosions-reported-at-site-of-boston-marathonhtml?pagewanted=all& r-0).
212. RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 432.
213. RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 432.
214. FoxNewsInsider, supra note 2.
215. Rascoff, supra note 203, at 167.
216. OIG REPORT, supra note 10, at 55.
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radicalization.217 The removal of texts was reported to frustrate inmates greatly;
some of whom were reading a particular book for decades, but now told the
text was off limits.218 The policy was more than mere paternalism since it
overlooked how such literature may help to buffer extremism and produce a
normalizing effect on inmates. Undoubtedly for some, such works can serve to
repulse Muslims in prison similar to how Muslims on the outside are repulsed
by extremist literature. Censorship potentially hinders more effective
monitoring of inmates, as one panelist at the 2011 hearings noted, "If an
individual in a correctional institution possesses these types of radical material,
it is actually, in a way, an investigative benefit because that person is then selfidentifying as someone that bears further inspection, and someone that can be
monitored by the correctional staff."2 19
Research points to more effective ways to deal with extremism in prisons.
According to one scholar, improvements in inmate safety and general
institutional security has played a major role-rendering prison riots
increasingly rare and a homicide rate that has fallen by ninety percent over
previous decades.220 Moreover, surveillance in prisons has greatly magnified
over the past twenty years and gang intelligence is more sophisticated-with
prison staff and administrators becoming more conscious of radicalization
trends and capable of defusing escalations. Unlike the fragmented
communications that characterized corrections in the past, today there is more
information sharing with other law enforcement agencies as routine parts of
administration. Moreover, prisons are efficient at restricting inmates from the
outside world. Inmates' ability to communicate and potentially receive
extremist influences from the outside world is limited as the Internet is
unavailable and mail is inspected and censored.
These findings, as noteworthy as they might be, should not be taken as
absolutes. Research as recent as 2006 and 2007 suggests that some penal
institutions and systems lack the ability to detect and analyze potential
abnormalities within inmate populations, and there is uncertainty as to whether
those trained to detect extremism in various state penitentiaries meet basic

217. Aamir Wyne, Dear God Give Me Back My Books: The Standardized Chapel
LibraryProjectand FreeExercise Rights, 11 J. CoNST. L. 1135, 1161 (2009).
218. Laurie Goodstein, Prisons Purging Books on Faith From Libraries, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/us/l0prison.html?page
wanted=all.
219. 2011 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 271 (statement of Kevin Smith, former
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California).
220. 2011 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 228-31 (statement of Bert Useem,
Professor of Sociology, Purdue University).
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quality measures and competencies.221 Further compromising security
measures, prisoners have developed their own countermeasures to surveillance,
including being detected for extremism. Indeed, it may be highly unlikely that
an extremist will let ideological leanings and recruitment efforts be freely
known to other prisoners, much less to prison security staff.2 22 One report even
suggests that radical inmates wishing to avoid detection may act as model
prisoners so that prison personnel focus attention on violent prisoners "while
overlooking radicalization."223
1.

Supporting Religious Pluralism in Prison

Fostering a more diverse and authentic marketplace of Islamic ideas will
have a normalizing effect on Islamic practice in prison. In theory, achieving a
more pluralistic religious environment strives to stimulate a multiplicity of
* 224
religious views and options as well as facilitate entry of a more diverse body
of Islamic leaders for programming. Practically, this might be carried out in
myriad ways, including by broadcasting live prayer services on closed-circuit
television, offering Arabic language classes to inmates, and, most critically,
creating imam-certification programming. These approaches recognize and
emphasize that Islam is a complex tradition, and that adopting any singular
approach to the religion is not only dangerous ideologically, but contrary to
religious life on the ground. Fostering a marketplace is the opposite of trying to
establish what one scholar has dubbed "Official Islam" or a governmentsponsored account of Islam.225
As for the concrete steps that prison officials and policymakers should take
to promote pluralism, lowering barriers for religious leaders to enter stands
paramount. The lack of Muslim religious leaders must be remedied such that
trained religious leaders are the rule, not the exception. In the Pew survey of
state prison chaplains, fifty-five percent of those surveyed agreed that Islam is
the faith group with the greatest need for more volunteers, while eighty-three
percent believed that Christian faith groups have "more than necessary."226
221. McKinley D. Coffin, Jr., Prison Radicalization: The New Extremist Training
Grounds? (Sept. 2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with
Naval Postgraduate School), available at http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/
10945/3307/07SepCoffin.pdf?sequence=1.
222. HAMM,supranote 30, at 111-12.
223. HSPI & CIAG REPORT, supra note 10, at 9.
224. See generally J. Scott Carpenter et al., Confronting the Ideology of Radical
Extremism, 3 J.NAT. SEC. L. & POL. 301, 303 (2009) ("It is essential to provide a multiplicity
of choices to distract or dissuade those tempted to join extremist causes.".
225. Rascoff, supra note 203, at 130.
226. PEW SURVEY, supra note 21, at 25, 44.
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Such statistics harken back to al-Muhajair's claim that radicalization occurs
when prisons "promote Christianity and starve Islam." 227 State correctional
institutions implementing similar bans or severe restrictions should also
reassess or, where applicable, develop policies that strike an adequate balance
between vetting and providing services.
Prison policies should also encourage what may be described as religious
entrepreneurship.In such an economy, prison officials and policymakers are
encouraged to engage with a wide variety of Muslim organizations to increase
access to various types of religious texts and religious workers that adhere to
various interpretations of Islam. For example, the Ohio Department of
Corrections has established a "Best Practices Tool-Kit" for faith-based
engagement that offers exemplary programs in which religious programming
converges with the goal of crime reduction. 2 2 8 In addition, prisons might
consider Folsom State Prison's Islamic Studies Program in California, which
was reported to help with inmate rehabilitation. 22 9 To avoid any potential state
endorsement of religion and ensure quality control in the curriculum, that
program could be done in partnership with an officially accredited academic
institution, such as a seminary or theological studies department at a college or
university. Saint Louis University's prison program is instructive here, since it
began by offering inmates a certificate in Theological Studies, which has
expanded into the opportunity to earn an associate's degree. 23 0
Corrections officials would also do well to invest in providing staff with
basic religious competency training and recruiting more Muslim staff.
Providing staff with basic religious sensitivity training and recruitment of
Muslim service providers will add more "cultural and political capital" to the
prison setting by adding legitimate and moderate voices of religious
authority. 231 The measure would also promote further goodwill and increase the
respect of prison administration officials among Muslim inmates.232 The
knowledge gained from religious competency training and Muslim prison staff
can assist in identifying extremism as well as avoiding unnecessary
confrontation with prisoners.

227.

Letter from Prisoner, supra note 1.

228. OHIO INSTITUTE ON CORRECTIONAL BEST PRACTICES, BEST PRACTICES TOOL-KiT:
FAITH BASED PROGRAMMING, REENTRY AND RECIDIVISM (2007) [hereinafter OHIO BEST
PRACTICES].

229.

Hamm, supra note 18, 667-69, 678.

230.

Prison Program, SAINT LouIs
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http://www.slu.edu/school-for-

professional-studies-home/prison-program/degree-program (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
231. HAMM, supra note 30, at 117-18.
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Prison administrations should also provide sufficient worship space for
different Muslim subgroups. In recent years, Sunni inmates have sued to have
services held separate from Shia inmates and vice versa; 233 yet some courts
have not been receptive to the idea.23 4 In practice, this judicial posture
overlooks important sectarian differences, which may have collateral outcomes.
For example, as neither sect is recognized as authoritative enough to warrant its
own space for worship, there is greater likelihood for rivalry and further
antagonism between both sides. Although prison authorities have cited security
reasons for not providing separate space for worship, it is precisely because of
security concerns, namely, sectarian tensions flaring, that administrators should
reconsider the wisdom. Hence, even though courts have handed down the
barest of threshold requirements for accommodating Muslims prisoners,
institutions are free to go beyond the minimum and provide separate space for
worship.
2.

Helping Former Prisoners Survive Outside

One sobering aspect of al-Muhajair's case rested in the fact that he was
close to his release at the time he wrote the letter.235 Whether inmates like alMuhajair can become successful at staying out of prison presents tremendous
challenges, much of which flows from the very status of being a felony convict.
For the more than 700,000 prisoners who return to society each year, a great
vacuum awaits, including restrictions on voting, welfare services, housing,
employment, and professional licensing.236 As one analyst attests, "Former
inmates are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment because many leave
prison with very little financial or social support." 237

233. See Pugh v. Goord, 345 F.3d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sunni adherents forced to
pray with Shias); Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sunni adherents
forced to pray with Shias ); Abdullah v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., No. 04-C-i 181, 2005 WL
2885802, at *3-4 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2005) (Sunni adherents forced to pray with members of
the Nation of Islam); Orafan v. Goord, 411 F. Supp. 2d 153, 156 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated
and remanded,249 Fed. Appx. 217 (2d Cir. 2007) (Shia adherents suing to obtain separate
worship services at prison facilities, vacated and remanded due to unresolved issues of
material fact).
234. See e.g., El Izquierdo v. Crawford, No. 1:05CV192 (CDP), 2007 WL 2873210, at
*5 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2007) (granting summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff
Sunni adherents were forced to pray with Shias).
235. Letter from Prisoner, supra note 1.
236. JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., FROM PRISON
CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER RE-ENTRY 19 (2001).
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Reentry presents opportunity for policy innovations to develop bridges
during this immediate transition period.238 However, if services are not
forthcoming, the void is vulnerable to being filled by others, including gang
leaders and other extremist elements. By providing for individuals in their time
of need, radical groups can offer means for survival, which has been a longtime
recruitment strategy for gangs.239 Facilitating the transition into a stable
environment will render ex-prisoners less susceptible to being recruited into
extremist activities. 2 40 The normative point is that officials must develop
policies that help individuals retuming from prison, rather than making it easier
for them to go back. The choice seems clear, either help inmates survive on the
outside or live with the consequences of allowing others to help them.
Administrators should implement re-entry services as an integral part of the
corrections process. As their release dates near, inmates should receive at
minimum a roadmap and plan for success and basic necessities, including a
driver's license, birth certificate, and social security card, as well as outpatient
medical and mental health care services if needed. Beyond the essentials,
correctional programming might explore ways to parole inmates into stable
religious communities. Although this is easier said than done, in the Islamic
context there is already intensive outreach among African-American mosques
241
and some partnerships are beginning to establish.
The best course to successful return to society is educational training on the
inside. Although there is little empirical research on whether education reduces
recidivism, education may militate against extremism directly, since groups
like al-Qaeda have been known to prey on uneducated individuals to conduct
their violent biddings.242
Developing solutions for successful re-entry is not solely the responsibility
of prison and criminal justice officials. Muslim communities and the greater
society at large have a significant stake in this matter, and can continue to
contribute in important ways. One way is to invest in long-term domestic
religious leadership education and development. For example, even in the
238. JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., FROM PRISON TO
CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER RE-ENTRY 19 (2001).
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absence of the BOP's hiring malaise, it is likely that state and federal prisons
would still have experienced shortages of professional Muslim religious
workers. Communities must continue to support existing institutions as well as
support the development of new ones.
Particularly, ex-prisoners need help finding a job, obtaining a temporary
place to live, and gaining access to mental or physical clinical services when
they are released. Unfortunately, there is some preliminary evidence from New
York and Indiana indicating that Muslim inmates are not getting enough help
from Islamic organizations.243 In general, the U.S. has witnessed unprecedented
numbers of released inmates returning to communities that are less stable and
less able to provide social services for the mass of individuals trying to
reintegrate. 244 This is largely due to cultural resistance as well as a lack of
funds in many urban areas that need services the most. 245 Local communities,
particularly those with more resources and funds, must continue to help lessresourced communities build infrastructure that will help parolees once they are
living on the outside.246 Ex-prisoners are doubly disadvantaged when returning
from prison, because they return to communities already struggling with high
rates of poverty and unemployment.
3.

Exploring Religious Programming as Best Practices

The statement, "Not all will accept the grace and redemption God offers,
but we should do all we can to ensure the opportunity for such offers to be
made," is a sentiment that might be a guiding principle for exploring the
prospects of religious programming as a best practice in prison
administration. 247 Best practice may be defined as falling on a continuum
ranging from those practices that are well established and have clearly
demonstrated their effectiveness to others, which, although promising, have not
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DEVEAUX & ASSOCIATES, MUSLIMS ON THE INSIDE: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF

(June 21, 2010), available at http://citizensinc.wordpress.com/
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244. Richard P. Seiter & Karen R. Kadela, PrisonerReentry: What Works, What Does
INCARCERATED MUSLIM

Not, and What is Promising,49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 360, 380 (2003).

245. Tanzeela Ahmad, The State of Muslim Social Services in America 13-15 (May
2006) (unpublished Honors thesis project, University of Tennessee) (on file with the
University of Tennessee), available at http://trace.tennessee.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?
article=1 929&context-utk chanhonoproj&sei-redir-1&referer-http.
246. See, e.g., Andrea Elliott, Between Black and Immigrant Muslims, an Uneasy
Alliance, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/1 1/world/
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yet been fully developed or documented.2 48 Hence, although there is scant
research available that evaluates the effectiveness of religious organizations, 24 9
for inmates, "what works" often involves religion. 2 50
The programming advocated here embraces a variety of religiously
oriented opportunities, including the opportunity for general religious study and
practice of one's own faith. This orientation is substantively different from
what are typically described as "faith-based" initiatives, since religious study
can be taken up by the faithful, faithless, and everyone else. Whereas faithbased initiatives are essentially theological in nature, religious study does not
require a faith commitment from the student. Furthermore, "faith-based"
implies reflection upon the particular faith of the student, whereas within a
religious studies framework, any religion may be the subject of study. This
point is crucial because it is the difference between sponsoring a particular faith
versus sponsoring the opportunity to learn about any faith-theistic and nontheistic alike.
To date, however, prison officials are most likely to treat religious
programming as primarily a First Amendment right that prisoners retain in
limited degree. Policymakers have failed to recognize religion as a learning tool
that is convergent with the broader programming goals of modifying inmate
behavior and reducing crime. Due to this orientation, institutions are more
likely to erect barriers for practicing inmates, even at the expense of
discouraging religious study and participation.
This posture can be seen in the often cited case, O'Lone v. Shabazz, a
Supreme Court decision upholding a prison work policy that prevented some
Muslims from attending Friday prayer service based on a reasonableness
standard. 2 5 1 Although the policy restricted some Muslims from attending the
weekly congregational practice, jumah, the Court found the policy reasonably
related to "legitimate penological objectives."252 This deferential standard
became a cornerstone doctrine for restricting inmates' free exercise of religion
since it was practically inscrutable from any free exercise claim. 2 53 The holding
248. OHIo BEST PRACTICES, supra note 228.
249. BYRON R. JOHNSON ET AL., OBJECTIVE HOPE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2002), available at

http://www.baylor.edulcontent/services/document.php/24809.pdf
250. Spearlt, Mental Illness in Prison: Inmate Rehabilitation & CorrectionalOfficers
in Crisis, 14 BERKELEY J.CRIM. L. 277,278 (2009).
251. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 344-45 (1987), superseded by
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as recognized in Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 71 n. 7 (5th Cir.
1995).
252. Estate ofShabazz, 482 U.S. at 353.
253. Shelly S. Rachanow, The Effect of O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz on the Free
Exercise Rights ofPrisoners,40 J.OF CHURCH & STATE 125, 126, 140-41 (1998).
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articulated in Shabazz is particularly unfortunate, since, as the dissent noted,
Christian and Jewish inmates were not affected by the restrictions for their
worship services.254 Although the restriction was garbed in the name of
institutional security, the policy effectively disrupted the Muslim community.
Creating barriers that prevent inmates from participating in religious
programming fails to harness the power of religion, and fails to consider the
alternatives open to inmates. There is little secret about the criminogenic
opportunities behind bars, including drug dealing and use, gangs, pimping,
prostitution, gambling, and other rapacious behavior. Considering these aspects
of prison life, that some inmates are prohibited from attending prayer services
is upside-down policy-rather than encouraging inmates to become involved in
more benign activities, they are prevented. Despite the potential benefits of
greater support for religious programming, few, if any, prisons have ever
pieced together a program that supports religious education and training as a
means of rehabilitationthrough education. The point is obvious considering

that taking up religious studies involves a range of related study areas,
including philosophy, theology, history, mathematics, language, and other
curricular areas of learning, including theories and methods of the humanities
and social sciences.
A more productive approach might be seen in a recent case settled on
behalf of a group of Muslim prisoners in the restrictive Administrative
Maximum unit at a BOP facility in Colorado.255 In the stipulation, the prison
agreed to allow Muslims to call inmates to prayer with sufficient volume,
guaranteed inmates the right to services by an Imam in Arabic, the right to a
sufficient Islamic library, and the right to correspondence courses, including
Arabic language courses. 256 Of particular interest is one term that stated,
"Inmates at the [prison] shall be allowed to participate in congregational prayer
in groups of no less than three (3) for periods of not less than thirty (30)
minutes at a time."257 These guarantees, although quite the exception, illustrate
how prisons can embrace religious programming, and prevent need for
litigation.
Even then, it is admittedly difficult to measure religious programming's
influence on an inmate's positive adjustment or successful transition back to
society. Lack of empirical data, however, should not deter prison officials from
exploring religious intervention in and outside prison. Nor should recidivism
254. Estate ofShabazz, 482 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255. Saleh v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 05-cv-02467-EWN-KLM (D.C. Colo. 2010),
available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/student-law-office-clinical-programs/SalehRel-Claims-Settlement.pdf.
256. Id
257. Id.

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

82

[Vol. 49:1

rates be used to downplay the efficacy of educational programming,
particularly since recidivism rates are often inflated as a result of individuals
who violate a term of release rather than commit a new crime. More critically,
recidivism rates are often inflated by mentally ill offenders, who are prone to
returning to prison. These realities complicate the assessment of outcome
measurements regarding religious and other programmatic interventions. They
also ignore tough-on-crime policies that make it likely a released individual
will end up in prison all over again. Notwithstanding how these faulty analytics
skew the value of religious programming centered on education, religious
services may have enormous potential to offer correctional systems and
cultures in the United States,258 and may offer programming that is uniquely
suited both to facilitate and augment the ongoing process of prisoner reentry. 25 9
Ultimately, administrators should explore how to harness the rehabilitative
aspects of religion more than it has to the present. Religious education and
fellowship opportunities should be developed and maintained by institutions
without fearing establishment clause violations any more than a religious
studies department at a state university would. The opportunity for religious
study should be afforded to inmates as a programming scheme based on what
helps released inmates stay out of prison. Such programming is different
qualitatively from other educational opportunities due to the emphasis on
morality and legal conduct. This is not just some area of study, but one that gets
at the ultimate questions of life and meaning of existence. For followers of
Islam in particular, formal religious education can have a direct impact in
reducing radicalization, since, according to a recent report, "For radical
Islamists, mainstream Islamic scholarship and ethics are a very real threat,
perhaps the biggest threat." 26 0 The opportunities for education in religious
programming are valuable in themselves, but particularly because the
educational outcomes converge with broader correctional goals and
management of extremism.
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